Private Credit and the Next Bear Market
Ken Fisher argues that private credit, despite widespread discussion, is already priced into markets and therefore unlikely to be the primary cause of the next bear market. He explains that bear markets are typically triggered by unexpected, undiscussed factors, and that private credit problems would only emerge as a reactive consequence during the late stages of a recession.
Summary
Ken Fisher discusses the relationship between private credit risks and potential market downturns. He emphasizes that heavily discussed topics in financial markets are already reflected in security prices, making surprise factors—not well-known risks—the true drivers of market movements. While acknowledging that private credit could contribute to a downturn, Fisher argues it won't be causal because the extensive discussion surrounding private credit issues has already priced them into the market.
Fisher outlines the typical pattern of bear markets, noting they often begin gently with volatility perceived as buying opportunities before deteriorating. He observes that bear markets tend to follow a 1/3 to 2/3 pattern in time versus magnitude: the first two-thirds of a bear market's duration accounts for only about one-third of the total decline, while the final third experiences approximately two-thirds of the drop. This acceleration occurs because recessions build momentum, causing business failures and debt defaults.
He positions private credit problems as a normal, expected consequence of business cycle recessions rather than a surprising catalyst. According to Fisher, recessions serve a cleansing function, eliminating excesses from prior expansions to establish a foundation for subsequent growth. Private credit deterioration would represent a reactive, later-stage function within this cycle, not a causal trigger. Fisher concludes that the widespread public discussion of private credit issues means any resulting problems would not qualify as the type of surprise that typically initiates bear markets.
Key Insights
- Market-moving surprises are typically things that are NOT widely discussed; extensively discussed topics like private credit are already priced into securities.
- Private credit may contribute to a downturn but won't cause it because the widespread discussion of private credit problems has already diminished and priced those risks.
- Bear markets follow a 1/3-2/3 pattern where the first two-thirds of the time period accounts for only one-third of the total decline, with the final third constituting two-thirds of the drop as recession momentum builds.
- Business cycle recessions serve a cleansing function, eliminating excesses from prior expansions, and any private credit problems that emerge would be a normal reactive consequence rather than a causal factor.
- Bear market recessions are typically caused by big, powerful, unpredicted factors that hadn't been previously noticed and pre-priced, not by widely anticipated risks.
Topics
Transcript
[0:03] [music] >> So, I can only say this so many ways. Whatever everybody talks about, whatever's widely discussed, is priced in capital market securities prices. It's surprise that moves markets the most. In the last 12 months, unlike the couple years before that, there's been endless discussion about problems in private credit. [0:34] Will private credit create the next bear market and recession? I'm going to tell you it might contribute to it, but it won't cause it, and I'll tell you how that would work. But, the fact that so many talk about it tell you it's already priced. It's better to focus on things everybody doesn't talk about. In fact, bear markets and recessions, when they [1:07]…
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