Ken Fisher Discusses Inflation, Sell America, US National Debt and More

Ken Fisher opens by cautioning that waiting for market clarity is expensive because markets move before clarity arrives. He then addresses four main questions submitted by viewers.

On inflation and recession: Fisher argues that looking backward at inflation or job numbers is not predictive of future recessions. He notes that current inflation levels — around 3% in the US — are actually below the averages seen over much of the last 50 years. He attributes lingering inflation fears to the post-Covid period when central banks increased money supply dramatically, causing 25–35% cumulative inflation in a few years. He argues that tightening monetary policy to fight high inflation could cause recession, but that current conditions do not warrant that concern.

On US investability and policy unpredictability: Fisher acknowledges that unpredictable US policy — tariffs, geopolitical moves — could theoretically matter, but argues that the US represents only about 25% of global GDP and that unpredictability exists throughout the world. He suggests the US economy has remained fundamentally steady despite political noise, and that policy unpredictability may be more perception than reality.

On 'Sell in May': Fisher dismisses this as 'mumbo jumbo nonsense,' pointing out that when properly calculated using indexes like the S&P 500 or the MSCI World Index, returns during the May–October period are actually net positive historically. He warns against letting a few extreme negative outcomes skew one's perception of what is normal. He also notes that stocks tend to rise before midterm elections — what he calls the 'Midterm Miracle' — making any sell-and-wait strategy counterproductive.

On the national debt: Fisher contends that the US national debt, while nominally large at $38 trillion, is not at problematic levels for a developed nation. His key argument is that if the debt were truly dangerous, long-term US interest rates would be far higher as lenders demanded greater compensation for default risk. He acknowledges that future risk is possible but argues it is not relevant to stock, bond, or GDP performance in the near term.