The Iran War Is Following This Three-Phase Pattern
Ken Fisher analyzes the Iran conflict through the lens of a predictable three-phase pattern observed in energy-centric wars, arguing that oil prices will likely return to pre-conflict levels. He also discusses how regime change wars typically unfold, noting that military forces in third-world countries often turn against their own regimes when threatened.
Summary
Ken Fisher opens by acknowledging the rapidly evolving nature of the Iranian conflict while promising to share observations he believes will remain durable over time. He draws on a historical framework of nine identifiable energy-centric conflicts since 1980 to contextualize his analysis.
Fisher describes a consistent three-phase pattern in energy-centric wars. Phase one occurs before fighting begins, when oil prices gradually rise as tensions build — in this case, oil climbed from $55 to $70 per barrel in the lead-up to the Iranian conflict. Phase two begins when fighting breaks out, causing markets to rapidly price in worst-case scenarios, spiking oil to approximately $120 per barrel almost immediately. Phase three involves markets gradually repricing toward more realistic, less catastrophic outcomes, causing oil to fall and stocks to recover — both of which, Fisher notes, have already been occurring, with stocks reaching all-time highs.
Fisher then makes a broader historical claim: in energy-centric conflicts, oil prices six to twelve months after the conflict begins are regularly lower than they were before the conflict started, returning to the cost-of-production baseline. He argues this is a structural, not incidental, outcome.
Shifting to the political dimension, Fisher discusses how regime change wars typically unfold in third-world nations, where militaries serve dual roles of external deterrence and internal population control. He argues that when regimes mishandle crises, their own militaries — which hold the actual power — begin prioritizing their own survival over loyalty to the regime, sometimes resulting in a junta-style takeover. He sees early signs of this dynamic in the IRGC's (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) recent behavior, acting independently of what the regime had previously signaled.
Fisher also highlights the overwhelming superiority of Western military technology over Eastern counterparts, a trend he traces back to the Falklands War in 1982, which has only widened since. He closes by lamenting the poor quality of current war reporting, warning viewers to be skeptical of opinion masquerading as fact, while expressing confidence that — if the U.S. remains perseverant — regime change in Iran is a likely eventual outcome.
Key Insights
- Fisher argues that in energy-centric wars, oil prices 6 to 12 months after conflict begins are regularly lower than pre-conflict levels, returning to the cost-of-production baseline — regardless of the specific details of the conflict.
- Fisher claims that markets in phase two of energy-centric wars spike oil prices by pre-pricing worst-case scenarios before facts emerge — in this case driving oil from $70 to approximately $120 per barrel almost immediately after fighting began.
- Fisher argues that in third-world nations, militaries serve dual roles of external deterrence and internal population control, and that when a regime mishandles a crisis, the military begins prioritizing its own survival over loyalty — often resulting in forced regime change or a junta takeover.
- Fisher interprets the IRGC acting independently of what the Iranian regime previously stated as a likely sign that the elite military is becoming more concerned with its own position and survival than with the existing regime — potentially signaling early-stage regime destabilization.
- Fisher contends that the superiority of Western military technology over Eastern gear has been widening since the Falklands War in the early 1980s and was displayed abundantly in the early phases of the Iranian conflict.
Topics
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