The Iran War Is Following This Three-Phase Pattern

Ken Fisher opens by acknowledging the rapidly evolving nature of the Iranian conflict while promising to share observations he believes will remain durable over time. He draws on a historical framework of nine identifiable energy-centric conflicts since 1980 to contextualize his analysis.

Fisher describes a consistent three-phase pattern in energy-centric wars. Phase one occurs before fighting begins, when oil prices gradually rise as tensions build — in this case, oil climbed from $55 to $70 per barrel in the lead-up to the Iranian conflict. Phase two begins when fighting breaks out, causing markets to rapidly price in worst-case scenarios, spiking oil to approximately $120 per barrel almost immediately. Phase three involves markets gradually repricing toward more realistic, less catastrophic outcomes, causing oil to fall and stocks to recover — both of which, Fisher notes, have already been occurring, with stocks reaching all-time highs.

Fisher then makes a broader historical claim: in energy-centric conflicts, oil prices six to twelve months after the conflict begins are regularly lower than they were before the conflict started, returning to the cost-of-production baseline. He argues this is a structural, not incidental, outcome.

Shifting to the political dimension, Fisher discusses how regime change wars typically unfold in third-world nations, where militaries serve dual roles of external deterrence and internal population control. He argues that when regimes mishandle crises, their own militaries — which hold the actual power — begin prioritizing their own survival over loyalty to the regime, sometimes resulting in a junta-style takeover. He sees early signs of this dynamic in the IRGC's (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) recent behavior, acting independently of what the regime had previously signaled.

Fisher also highlights the overwhelming superiority of Western military technology over Eastern counterparts, a trend he traces back to the Falklands War in 1982, which has only widened since. He closes by lamenting the poor quality of current war reporting, warning viewers to be skeptical of opinion masquerading as fact, while expressing confidence that — if the U.S. remains perseverant — regime change in Iran is a likely eventual outcome.