From the archive – ‘A merry-go-round of buck-passing’: inside the four-year Grenfell inquiry
Robert Booth's analysis of the four-year Grenfell inquiry reveals how 72 deaths resulted from a complex web of corporate buck-passing, cost-cutting, and regulatory failures. The inquiry exposed systemic problems with modern outsourcing culture where responsibility is endlessly deferred across supply chains.
Summary
The Guardian's social affairs correspondent Robert Booth examines the £149 million Grenfell inquiry that investigated the 2017 fire claiming 72 lives. The inquiry, chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, was divided into two phases: Phase 1 focused on the night of the fire and criticized the London Fire Brigade's response, while Phase 2 examined the deadly cladding system installation. The investigation revealed shocking corporate misconduct across multiple companies. Celotex manipulated fire safety tests by secretly including fire-retardant materials to help their combustible insulation pass certification, with employee Jonathan Roper candidly admitting the company prioritized profits over safety. Kingspan sold insulation based on outdated test results after changing their product formulation, continuing sales despite a 2007 test that became 'a raging inferno.' Arconic, which made the aluminum cladding panels, had internal emails showing executives knew the dangers of their polyethylene-core panels, with one writing 'we have to keep this very confidential' about the fire risks. The inquiry exposed a council culture that viewed Grenfell Tower as worthless property, with officials more concerned about cladding colors than safety. A key cost-cutting decision switched from non-combustible zinc panels to dangerous ACM panels, saving £293,368. The investigation revealed a dysfunctional chain of subcontracting where responsibility was constantly 'flowed' to others, with building inspectors overwhelmed by austerity cuts. Government ministers ignored repeated warnings about cladding dangers, prioritizing David Cameron's 'red tape bonfire' over safety regulations. Despite a 2009 cladding fire that killed six people and a coroner's warnings about unclear building regulations, promised safety guidance updates never materialized. Booth argues the disaster reflects deeper problems with modern supply chains where complex subcontracting creates 'violence of distance' - allowing cruel outcomes through non-cruel people who see only their small part of a larger, deadly system.
Key Insights
- Booth argues that the inquiry revealed a 'merry-go-round of buck-passing' where 27 commercial organizations and 8 public bodies each claimed key decisions were someone else's responsibility
- The author contends that Celotex engaged in shocking deception by secretly including fire-retardant magnesium oxide boards in their safety tests to make their combustible insulation appear safe
- Booth reports that Kingspan continued selling insulation for hundreds of high-rise buildings despite internal documents showing a 2007 test of their modified product became 'a raging inferno'
- The investigation found that Arconic executives knew their polyethylene-core panels were dangerous on facades, with internal emails stating 'we have to keep this very confidential' about fire risks
- Booth argues that the council treated Grenfell residents as 'sub-citizens' and viewed the tower as worthless property that 'blights the surrounding area'
- The author claims that switching from zinc to ACM cladding panels saved £293,368 but created the deadly fire spread mechanism that killed 72 people
- Booth suggests that David Cameron's 'red tape bonfire' and deregulation agenda prevented updating crucial fire safety guidance despite repeated warnings about cladding dangers
- The author argues that modern supply chain complexity creates 'violence of distance' where cruel outcomes result from non-cruel people who cannot see the full consequences of their actions
Topics
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