James Bosworth on the "Orange Wave" Happening Across Latin America

The episode of Odd Lots features James Bosworth (Boz), a Latin America expert and author of the Latin America Risk Report newsletter, recorded on April 7th against a backdrop of a fictional US-Iran conflict that the hosts use as a framing device after a successful Venezuela operation removed Nicolas Maduro. Boz explains that unlike previous eras when Latin America was largely ignored by the US, the Trump administration has made the Western Hemisphere a central foreign policy focus, exemplified by events like the Shield of the Americas conference and maps depicting a 'Greater North America' extending to Colombia and Venezuela.

Boz introduces the concept of the 'orange shift,' a rightward political wave of leaders aligning with Trump, which he distinguishes from the earlier 'pink tide' of left-wing leaders in the 2000s. He notes that this orange bloc is not monolithic — it includes security populists like Bukele, libertarians like Milei, technocrats like Abinader in the Dominican Republic, and Bolsonaro-style right-wing populists. He emphasizes that Trump's relationships with these leaders are personal and transactional rather than doctrine-based, making future policy unpredictable.

On Venezuela, Boz explains that Delcy Rodriguez's rise to effective power is widely accepted because Maduro was universally unpopular, having stolen elections and presided over one of the worst economic collapses in history. Delcy is described as a pragmatic dealmaker who has given Trump access to Venezuelan oil routed through US government bank accounts — a quasi-colonial arrangement that Boz finds shocking but real. He notes the Venezuelan diaspora is cautiously hopeful but uncertain whether the endgame is democratization (Marco Rubio's stated plan) or consolidation of power (Delcy's likely goal).

The discussion covers several regional leaders in depth. Claudia Scheinbaum in Mexico maintains mid-60s approval ratings by combining AMLO-style populist economic support with improved security and technocratic management. Bukele in El Salvador holds 60-70% approval due to dramatic crime reduction, but his economic record is weak — foreign investment has not followed improved security because his methods rely on corrupt deals rather than rule of law, undermining business confidence. Milei in Argentina has brought inflation down from 200% to 30-35%, but Boz argues this is graded on a steep curve, and with the Strait of Hormuz crisis, inflation may rise back to 40-45% by year end. The deeper problem is Argentina's political economy — as long as Peronists are seen as a credible threat to return to power, investor confidence is fragile and the boom-bust cycle will continue.

On Lula in Brazil, Boz notes that despite market panic at every Lula election, Brazilian markets have consistently performed well under his leadership. Employment is up, inflation is mild, and crime is at a 10-year low. However, the Banco Master corruption scandal has hurt his polling, and Flavio Bolsonaro is gaining ground. Boz argues Lula actually prefers a two-way race against Bolsonaro because it activates his coalition, and believes Lula is more likely than not to win reelection. He also notes that Trump's targeting of Brazil's PICS financial transfer system and tariffs could ironically generate an anti-Trump political bump that benefits Lula.

The Bukele security model is examined as a template others want to replicate, but Boz is skeptical of its transferability. El Salvador's success relied on a deal with a single dominant gang (MS-13) in a tiny country. Ecuador, with 22 gangs and a larger population, has seen crime rise despite adopting similar rhetoric and even US special forces assistance. The model works as a campaign strategy but has not proven effective as actual policy elsewhere.

On China, Boz argues that China has essentially replicated the colonial trade model — buying Latin American commodities while flooding the region with cheap manufactured goods that prevent Latin America from moving up the value chain. Chinese infrastructure investment has had mixed results, with quality issues (cracked dams in Ecuador) and a practice of importing Chinese labor rather than employing locals. Boz believes China cannot be blocked from the region, but the US should push for fairer trade rules and higher standards for Chinese infrastructure projects.

On Cuba, Boz puts 70-80% odds on Cuba aligning with the Trump administration within 12 months, though he distinguishes this from true regime change — the Cuban Communist Party will likely remain in power under a new face, similar to the Venezuela model. Trump is using sanctions as coercive leverage, and the Cuban regime, desperate to rescue its economy, may be willing to cut a deal.

Boz closes by arguing that the orange shift has a hard end date of January 2029 when Trump leaves office, and that these alliances will not survive in their current form. He expresses hope that a future administration will maintain the US's newfound focus on the Western Hemisphere but with a less militaristic and more development-oriented approach.