Estalla la GUERRA en ETIOPÍA | ¿Qué está pasando?

Ethiopia, Africa's second most populous country, has entered another devastating internal conflict with far more dangerous implications than the previous Tigray War (2020-2022). On September 23, 2026, Tigrayan forces launched a major offensive, and days prior, seven armed movements from different regions announced the Alliance of Ethiopian Peoples' Forces for Survival, with the stated goal of overthrowing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and establishing a transitional government.

Historically, Ethiopia maintained independence through much of the colonial period, defeating Italy in 1896 and becoming an African symbol of anti-colonial resistance. Following the 1974 communist Derg regime, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) led a coalition that took power in 1991, establishing a federal system organized around ethnic and linguistic identities. This gave regions like Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara significant autonomy and even constitutional rights to self-determination.

When Oromo reformist Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, he initially earned international praise (including the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize) for releasing political prisoners and making peace with Eritrea. However, he began dismantling the federal coalition structure and consolidating power through a new Prosperity Party, which the TPLF rejected as a threat to the federal system and regional autonomy.

This tension exploded in November 2020 when fighting erupted between the federal government (supported by Eritrea and Amhara militias) and the TPLF. After two brutal years and a ceasefire agreement in November 2022, multiple unresolved issues remained: territorial disputes between Tigray and Amhara in western regions, Eritrea's suspicions about Ethiopian-Tigrayan reconciliation, and Abiy's ambitions to access Red Sea ports (particularly Assab in Eritrea) rather than relying solely on Djibouti.

By 2026, Abiy had created enemies from all his former allies. Amhara's Fano militias rebelled when the government attempted to integrate regional forces into federal structures. Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) insurgents continued fighting over marginalization and self-determination despite Abiy being Oromo himself. Meanwhile, Eritrea—once an ally—became suspicious and potentially hostile over maritime and territorial issues.

The new rebel alliance is militarily formidable: the TPLF has decades of combat experience and mobilized forces; Fano has deep local networks in Amhara; OLA has operated as an insurgency in Oromia for years; and smaller groups like the Ogaden National Liberation Front and Benishangul-Gumuz movements add additional pressure. However, the alliance contains profound internal contradictions—Tigrayans and Amharas have serious territorial disputes, they fought on opposite sides in the previous war, and Oromo nationalists have separate political visions for Ethiopia's future.

Militarily, Abiy's government retains significant advantages: the Ethiopian National Defense Forces control aviation, artillery, mechanized units, and crucially, combat drones that were decisive in the Tigray War. The government controls state institutions, infrastructure, federal budget, and international connections. However, fighting on multiple fronts separated by hundreds of kilometers creates a strategic vulnerability: reinforcing the north weakens Oromia; concentrating against Fano opens space for Tigrayans; defending everywhere spreads forces too thin.

Geography intensifies the challenge. Tigray's borders with Eritrea (north), Sudan (west), Afar (east), and Amhara (south) provide multiple infiltration routes and supply lines. Western Tigray connects to Sudan, allowing external support. Control of Mekele and Aksum airports limits government air operations. The Red Sea ports introduce massive international interests, as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey, and other regional powers have stakes in Ethiopia's stability and control of maritime passages.

Eritrea emerges as the most destabilizing external actor. Officially denying support for insurgents, Eritrea has overlapping interests with the TPLF against Abiy—a weakened Ethiopian government reduces pressure on Eritrean sovereignty and blocks Ethiopian ambitions to control Assab. Sudan's ongoing civil war further complicates matters, as Tigrayans operate from Sudanese territory and various Ethiopian factions maintain cross-border connections with Sudanese actors.

The 2022 Pretoria agreement that supposedly ended the Tigray War has now completely collapsed, leaving fundamental political questions unresolved. Ethiopia has survived empires, invasions, dictatorships, communist revolutions, and civil wars, but has never resolved how to balance a strong centralized state with the enormous diversity of its peoples. Ethnic federalism attempted autonomy-based solutions; Abiy attempted to strengthen national identity and centrality. Now, regional groups threatened by centralism have united against him.

The conflict's outcome hinges on whether the seven rebel groups can genuinely coordinate operations across vast distances or whether internal contradictions will fracture the alliance, allowing Abiy to defeat enemies separately. If coordination succeeds, Ethiopia faces a broader, more devastating national war. If the alliance collapses, Abiy may survive. What remains certain is that the previous war's unresolved tensions have exploded into a far more complex, multi-front conflict with international dimensions that could draw in regional and global powers.