The most important battle of the Civil War | Gary Gallagher and Lex Fridman

Gary Gallagher provides a detailed analysis of two major 1863 Civil War campaigns: Vicksburg and Gettysburg. He begins by explaining that Vicksburg was the last major Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River. Grant conducted one of the most impressive campaigns in U.S. military history, cutting loose from supply lines and taking great risks by crossing the Mississippi River and investing the city from the east. The siege lasted from May until July 4th, 1863, when Vicksburg surrendered—the same day Lee retreated from Gettysburg, a coincidence many contemporaries viewed as divine intervention.

Gallagher then shifts to Gettysburg, beginning with Lee's strategic objectives for his second invasion of the North. Lee wanted to take the war out of Virginia to allow agricultural recovery, provision his army from the rich Cumberland Valley in Pennsylvania, and keep the Union Army occupied. His cavalry commander Jeb Stuart, seeking redemption after nearly losing at the Battle of Brandy Station, decided to ride around the Army of the Potomac for dramatic effect. This left Lee without crucial intelligence, causing him to spread his army across southern Pennsylvania. When Lee learned the Union Army was closer than expected, he ordered his forces to concentrate near Gettysburg, not intending to bring on a major battle. However, a meeting engagement on July 1st escalated into the three-day battle.

During the battle, Lee maintained tactical initiative and attacked on all three days while the Federals defended. Despite Union numerical superiority (85,000-88,000 versus 75,000 Confederate troops), Lee came close to victory on the second day. On the third day, frustrated and expecting too much from his infantry, Lee ordered the direct assault known as Pickett's Charge—a frontal assault by 12,500 infantry that failed completely. Lee accepted full responsibility, writing to his wife and Jefferson Davis that he had asked too much of his infantry. He lost approximately 25,000 men (over a third of his army) and a third of his corps of generals killed, wounded, or captured.

Gallagher argues that Lee should have followed Edward Porter Alexander's suggestion to take the strong position won on July 1st and force the Union Army to attack him. This aggressiveness, while characteristic of Lee, proved costly. Importantly, Gallagher contends that Gettysburg was not the true turning point because Lee escaped with his army intact. Lincoln recognized this, becoming disappointed when General Meade allowed Lee to retreat without harassment. In contrast, Grant's capture of Pemberton's entire army at Vicksburg—only the second time Grant had forced a Confederate army to surrender—represented a more decisive victory. The fall of Vicksburg gave the Union complete control of the Mississippi River. Grant's subsequent victory at Chattanooga in late 1863 led Lincoln to promote him to general-in-chief with the rank of lieutenant general in March 1864.