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The most important battle of the Civil War | Gary Gallagher and Lex Fridman

Lex Clips

Gary Gallagher discusses the significance of the Vicksburg and Gettysburg campaigns in the Civil War, arguing that Vicksburg was actually the more decisive turning point than Gettysburg because Grant captured an entire Confederate army, while Lee managed to escape after Gettysburg. The conversation explores Lee's strategic decisions, his aggressive tactics that cost him heavily, and how Grant's subsequent victories led to his elevation to general-in-chief.

Summary

Gary Gallagher provides a detailed analysis of two major 1863 Civil War campaigns: Vicksburg and Gettysburg. He begins by explaining that Vicksburg was the last major Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River. Grant conducted one of the most impressive campaigns in U.S. military history, cutting loose from supply lines and taking great risks by crossing the Mississippi River and investing the city from the east. The siege lasted from May until July 4th, 1863, when Vicksburg surrendered—the same day Lee retreated from Gettysburg, a coincidence many contemporaries viewed as divine intervention.

Gallagher then shifts to Gettysburg, beginning with Lee's strategic objectives for his second invasion of the North. Lee wanted to take the war out of Virginia to allow agricultural recovery, provision his army from the rich Cumberland Valley in Pennsylvania, and keep the Union Army occupied. His cavalry commander Jeb Stuart, seeking redemption after nearly losing at the Battle of Brandy Station, decided to ride around the Army of the Potomac for dramatic effect. This left Lee without crucial intelligence, causing him to spread his army across southern Pennsylvania. When Lee learned the Union Army was closer than expected, he ordered his forces to concentrate near Gettysburg, not intending to bring on a major battle. However, a meeting engagement on July 1st escalated into the three-day battle.

During the battle, Lee maintained tactical initiative and attacked on all three days while the Federals defended. Despite Union numerical superiority (85,000-88,000 versus 75,000 Confederate troops), Lee came close to victory on the second day. On the third day, frustrated and expecting too much from his infantry, Lee ordered the direct assault known as Pickett's Charge—a frontal assault by 12,500 infantry that failed completely. Lee accepted full responsibility, writing to his wife and Jefferson Davis that he had asked too much of his infantry. He lost approximately 25,000 men (over a third of his army) and a third of his corps of generals killed, wounded, or captured.

Gallagher argues that Lee should have followed Edward Porter Alexander's suggestion to take the strong position won on July 1st and force the Union Army to attack him. This aggressiveness, while characteristic of Lee, proved costly. Importantly, Gallagher contends that Gettysburg was not the true turning point because Lee escaped with his army intact. Lincoln recognized this, becoming disappointed when General Meade allowed Lee to retreat without harassment. In contrast, Grant's capture of Pemberton's entire army at Vicksburg—only the second time Grant had forced a Confederate army to surrender—represented a more decisive victory. The fall of Vicksburg gave the Union complete control of the Mississippi River. Grant's subsequent victory at Chattanooga in late 1863 led Lincoln to promote him to general-in-chief with the rank of lieutenant general in March 1864.

Key Insights

  • Vicksburg was more important as a turning point than Gettysburg because Grant captured an entire Confederate army under Pemberton, whereas Lee managed to escape with his army intact after Gettysburg, meaning Lee's defeat was incomplete
  • Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania in June 1863 was not intended to capture Washington, but rather to reorient the war by moving it north, provisioning his army from the Cumberland Valley, and keeping Virginia's agriculture safe from military presence
  • The Battle of Gettysburg was not a planned engagement but occurred because Jeb Stuart's cavalry failed to do its job—Stuart sought redemption after nearly losing at Brandy Station by attempting a dramatic ride around the Union Army, leaving Lee without intelligence
  • Lee lost approximately a third of his entire corps of generals—17 of his 52 generals became casualties killed, wounded, or captured—during the Gettysburg campaign, representing a devastating blow to Confederate officer corps
  • Lincoln did not regard Gettysburg as the war's turning point and expressed frustration that Meade let Lee escape; he believed the war would continue indefinitely because Lee's army remained capable of fighting

Topics

Vicksburg Campaign (1863)Siege operations and logisticsBattle of Gettysburg (July 1863)Robert E. Lee's military strategy and aggressivenessGrant's ascension to general-in-chiefUnion and Confederate military leadershipCavalry operations and Jeb StuartTurning points in the American Civil War

Transcript

[0:03] Can you speak to Vicksburg? This is 63. >> Yeah, this is 63 and Vicksburg is the last major Confederate citadel on the Mississippi River. They've already lost New Orleans. They've lost so they've lost the river. It's not a Confederate river anymore. But they still have a strong point at Vicksburg and another one at Port Hudson in northern Louisiana. Grant has been operating against Vicksburg since the winter of '62 and he's finally through a series of trial and errors and failures he's finally found a way that he thinks he can get to [0:33] the city. He takes great risks. He crosses the Mississippi River after having the Union Navy run past all the batteries, the…

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