The Wars That Made Machiavelli - Ada Palmer
Ada Palmer traces the intellectual lineage from Petrarch's humanist project to Machiavelli's political science. Petrarch believed reading classical texts would instill virtue in leaders, but the catastrophic wars of Machiavelli's era proved this insufficient. Machiavelli responded by proposing an empirical, case-based study of history to identify what actually worked in practice.
Summary
The transcript opens with Petrarch's response to the devastation of the Black Death. Surrounded by loss and tragedy, Petrarch concluded that the core problem of his age was selfish, self-interested leadership. Inspired by Roman figures like Brutus — who famously executed his own sons for treason against the state — Petrarch believed that if leaders could be educated on the same classical texts that shaped Roman virtue, they would absorb the courage, justice, and prudence of the ancients. This became the foundation of the humanist project: filling libraries with Plato, Homer, Cicero, and Livy so that the next generation of princes would be morally transformed by their reading.
However, as Ada Palmer explains, this project ultimately failed in practice. The princes who were raised on Latin and Greek, who could impress scholars with their classical knowledge, went on to fight wars that were even more destructive than those that preceded them. Machiavelli witnessed these conflicts firsthand, having been raised on the very Petrarchan curriculum that was supposed to produce virtuous rulers.
Rather than abandoning the classics entirely, Machiavelli reconceived how they should be used. He proposed what Palmer describes as an early form of political science: instead of reading about virtuous men and hoping moral qualities would transfer through admiration, one should study historical examples comparatively and empirically. By placing five battles near rivers side by side, for instance, a reader could analyze the decisions commanders made and determine which strategies succeeded. This case-based methodology — imitating what worked and avoiding what didn't — is why Machiavelli was regarded by his contemporaries not merely as a philosopher, but as a historian.
Key Insights
- Petrarch argued that selfish leadership was the root cause of his era's suffering, and proposed that immersing future leaders in classical Roman texts would instill the same virtues displayed by figures like Brutus, who executed his own sons to protect the state.
- The humanist educational project failed on its own terms: the princes who received a full classical education in Latin and Greek went on to fight wars even larger and more destructive than those before them, disproving the assumption that reading virtuous men would make virtuous rulers.
- Machiavelli retained his belief in the deep power of the classics despite witnessing the failure of Petrarch's project, but concluded that the libraries were right while the method of using them was wrong.
- Machiavelli proposed using history as a casebook — comparing multiple examples of similar situations side by side to determine which decisions worked and which did not, shifting from moral inspiration to empirical pattern recognition.
- Because of his comparative, evidence-based approach to studying historical examples, Machiavelli was described by his contemporaries as a historian rather than a moral philosopher or political theorist.
Topics
Transcript
[0:00] When Petrarch survives the Black Death after losing so many friends, he gets a letter. Two of his friends are alive. He had given up that anyone he knew would survive. They're going to come visit him on the way they were attacked by bandits and one of them was killed and the other was lost in the mountains and wounded and he didn't know that his friend was alive for another year and a half. And Pedro looks around him and says, "This is an age of ash and shadow. What we need is to imitate the arts of the ancients. Let's try to figure out how the Romans did it. And specifically, the [0:31] problem is our…
Full transcript available for MurmurCast members
Sign Up to AccessMore from Dwarkesh Patel
The Army Sent to Stop Cortés Joined Him Instead - Si Sheppard
Spanish conquistador Cortés faced a threat from Governor Velázquez of Cuba, who sent Don Narvaez with a larger force to arrest him for exceeding his authority. Rather than being defeated, Cortés defeated Narvaez in battle and persuaded the expeditionary force to join him by promising shared wealth from the empire, turning potential enemies into reinforcements.
How 168 Men Captured the Inca Emperor - Si Sheppard
Francisco Pizarro, with only 168 men, captured the Inca Emperor Atahualpa in 1532 at Cajamarca by using psychological tactics with horses and an ambush strategy. Despite Atahualpa's show of dominance and his large army, Pizarro's surprise attack and capture of the emperor allowed him to control the entire Inca social hierarchy.
The Myth of the Helpless Aztecs and Inca - Si Sheppard
Si Sheppard argues that the Aztecs and Incas were not helpless victims but actively developed countermeasures and adaptive strategies against Spanish conquistadors, including terrain manipulation, weapon improvisation, and tactical learning—though they lacked sufficient time to fully master foreign technologies.
How Conquistadors Conquered the Aztecs - Si Sheppard
Conquistador success against the Aztecs relied primarily on steel weapons, horses, and psychological tactics rather than firearms. Steel armor and swords proved far more effective than indigenous weapons made of wood, stone, and obsidian, while horses—animals unknown to the Aztecs—provided decisive military and logistical advantages.
How did a few hundred Spanish soldiers topple two empires? – Si Sheppard
Military historian Si Sheppard explains how a few hundred Spanish conquistadors were able to conquer the Aztec and Inca Empires within just a few years through a combination of technological advantages (horses, steel weapons), psychological warfare, diplomatic manipulation of existing divisions among indigenous peoples, and the catastrophic impact of disease. The conquests were contingent on individual leadership decisions and geographic factors, but were fundamentally enabled by the conquistadors' ability to exploit internal rifts within empires that appeared monolithic from the outside.