The Real Effects of the Six Day War - Sarah Paine
Sarah Paine explains how Egypt's closure of the Suez Canal during the Six Day War had unexpected strategic consequences that reshaped global shipping. The blockade forced the development of much larger cargo ships that could not fit through the canal, fundamentally altering maritime economics in ways that persisted long after the canal reopened.
Summary
Sarah Paine discusses the Six Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, focusing on Egypt's strategy to block Israel's access to the Suez Canal by sinking block ships. While this was an effective operational tactic, the real strategic consequences were far more significant and unexpected. Before the war, nearly 90% of ships were 50,000 dead weight tons or smaller, allowing them to transit through the Suez Canal. However, when the canal closed from 1967 to 1972—a significant disruption to world trade—shipping companies adapted by developing much larger vessels. By 1972, almost 30% of ships in operation were these enormous new ships that could never fit through the Suez Canal, even after it was later widened. This technological shift had major economic implications: shipping oil from the Persian Gulf to Rotterdam in the Netherlands costs slightly over $13 per ton using small ships through the canal, but only about one-third that price using large ships traveling the long route around Africa. Paine emphasizes that this demonstrates how strategic effects can be entirely unexpected, and that in shipping economics, vessel size matters far more than distance—overhead costs are dramatically reduced by using larger ships on longer routes.
Key Insights
- Before the Six Day War, almost 90% of ships were 50,000 dead weight tons or less and could transit the Suez Canal, but the canal's closure forced a fundamental shift in shipping technology.
- The Suez Canal closure from 1967 to 1972 prompted the development of massive new ships that could never fit through the canal, with almost 30% of the fleet consisting of these huge vessels by 1972.
- Shipping oil from the Persian Gulf to Rotterdam costs slightly over $13 per ton through the Suez Canal on small ships, but only about one-third that price using large ships around Africa.
- The strategic effect of the Suez Canal blockade was entirely unexpected—it reshaped global shipping economics in ways that persisted long after the canal reopened and was widened.
- In maritime shipping economics, vessel size is the primary factor determining overhead costs and efficiency, not distance traveled.
Topics
Transcript
[0:00] Israel fighting Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. And as part of Egypt's strategy, doesn't want Israel using the Suez Canal. So they sink a bunch of block ships here. So that's the operational effect. But here is the strategic effect, the ones that actually count. If you look at before the war, almost 90% of ships were 50,000 dead weight tons or less. And so they could all make it through the Suez Canal. But then the Suez Canal is is closed down from 1967 to 1972ish. So that's a long time in world trade. Well, look at the adjustments that take [0:32] place. By 72, you got almost 30% of the number of ships are these huge ships that…
Full transcript available for MurmurCast members
Sign Up to AccessMore from Dwarkesh Patel
The Army Sent to Stop Cortés Joined Him Instead - Si Sheppard
Spanish conquistador Cortés faced a threat from Governor Velázquez of Cuba, who sent Don Narvaez with a larger force to arrest him for exceeding his authority. Rather than being defeated, Cortés defeated Narvaez in battle and persuaded the expeditionary force to join him by promising shared wealth from the empire, turning potential enemies into reinforcements.
How 168 Men Captured the Inca Emperor - Si Sheppard
Francisco Pizarro, with only 168 men, captured the Inca Emperor Atahualpa in 1532 at Cajamarca by using psychological tactics with horses and an ambush strategy. Despite Atahualpa's show of dominance and his large army, Pizarro's surprise attack and capture of the emperor allowed him to control the entire Inca social hierarchy.
The Myth of the Helpless Aztecs and Inca - Si Sheppard
Si Sheppard argues that the Aztecs and Incas were not helpless victims but actively developed countermeasures and adaptive strategies against Spanish conquistadors, including terrain manipulation, weapon improvisation, and tactical learning—though they lacked sufficient time to fully master foreign technologies.
How Conquistadors Conquered the Aztecs - Si Sheppard
Conquistador success against the Aztecs relied primarily on steel weapons, horses, and psychological tactics rather than firearms. Steel armor and swords proved far more effective than indigenous weapons made of wood, stone, and obsidian, while horses—animals unknown to the Aztecs—provided decisive military and logistical advantages.
How did a few hundred Spanish soldiers topple two empires? – Si Sheppard
Military historian Si Sheppard explains how a few hundred Spanish conquistadors were able to conquer the Aztec and Inca Empires within just a few years through a combination of technological advantages (horses, steel weapons), psychological warfare, diplomatic manipulation of existing divisions among indigenous peoples, and the catastrophic impact of disease. The conquests were contingent on individual leadership decisions and geographic factors, but were fundamentally enabled by the conquistadors' ability to exploit internal rifts within empires that appeared monolithic from the outside.