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The Real Effects of the Six Day War - Sarah Paine

Dwarkesh Patel

Sarah Paine explains how Egypt's closure of the Suez Canal during the Six Day War had unexpected strategic consequences that reshaped global shipping. The blockade forced the development of much larger cargo ships that could not fit through the canal, fundamentally altering maritime economics in ways that persisted long after the canal reopened.

Summary

Sarah Paine discusses the Six Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, focusing on Egypt's strategy to block Israel's access to the Suez Canal by sinking block ships. While this was an effective operational tactic, the real strategic consequences were far more significant and unexpected. Before the war, nearly 90% of ships were 50,000 dead weight tons or smaller, allowing them to transit through the Suez Canal. However, when the canal closed from 1967 to 1972—a significant disruption to world trade—shipping companies adapted by developing much larger vessels. By 1972, almost 30% of ships in operation were these enormous new ships that could never fit through the Suez Canal, even after it was later widened. This technological shift had major economic implications: shipping oil from the Persian Gulf to Rotterdam in the Netherlands costs slightly over $13 per ton using small ships through the canal, but only about one-third that price using large ships traveling the long route around Africa. Paine emphasizes that this demonstrates how strategic effects can be entirely unexpected, and that in shipping economics, vessel size matters far more than distance—overhead costs are dramatically reduced by using larger ships on longer routes.

Key Insights

  • Before the Six Day War, almost 90% of ships were 50,000 dead weight tons or less and could transit the Suez Canal, but the canal's closure forced a fundamental shift in shipping technology.
  • The Suez Canal closure from 1967 to 1972 prompted the development of massive new ships that could never fit through the canal, with almost 30% of the fleet consisting of these huge vessels by 1972.
  • Shipping oil from the Persian Gulf to Rotterdam costs slightly over $13 per ton through the Suez Canal on small ships, but only about one-third that price using large ships around Africa.
  • The strategic effect of the Suez Canal blockade was entirely unexpected—it reshaped global shipping economics in ways that persisted long after the canal reopened and was widened.
  • In maritime shipping economics, vessel size is the primary factor determining overhead costs and efficiency, not distance traveled.

Topics

Six Day War strategic consequencesSuez Canal closure and blockadeShipping industry transformationMaritime economics and vessel sizeLong-term geopolitical effects on trade

Transcript

[0:00] Israel fighting Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. And as part of Egypt's strategy, doesn't want Israel using the Suez Canal. So they sink a bunch of block ships here. So that's the operational effect. But here is the strategic effect, the ones that actually count. If you look at before the war, almost 90% of ships were 50,000 dead weight tons or less. And so they could all make it through the Suez Canal. But then the Suez Canal is is closed down from 1967 to 1972ish. So that's a long time in world trade. Well, look at the adjustments that take [0:32] place. By 72, you got almost 30% of the number of ships are these huge ships that…

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